Excerpt] This paper presents estimates of the relationship between the performance and compensation of local building trades union leaders. A growing literature has revived the common-sense notion that organizations should structure the compensation of both their employees and their executives so as to encourage them to take actions consistent with the goals of the organizations. One way to minimize the probability that executives will take actions contrary to the organization's goals is to tie their compensation to measures of their organization's performance.
to maximize the firm's profits. Tying executives' compensation directly to their firm's profitability through stock options or bonus schemes is one strategy available to induce this behavior/ 2 Recent empirical evidence indicates that business firms do pursue such strategies. 3 It should be equally rational for public and private nonprofit organizations to tie their employees' or executives' compensation to the achievement of the organizations' goals, and a number of studies have documented that several types of nonprofit organizations do. University professors' compensation, for example, appears to be related to variables reflecting their contributions toward achieving the multiple goals of their institutions (research, teaching, and admin-istrative activity). 4 Similarly, it has been shown that the compensation of a number of categories of municipal government officials (city managers and police and fire chiefs) is systematically related to several derived measures of their success in meeting municipal taxpayers' objectives. 5 In this paper we extend the previous literature by seeking to ascertain if the compensation of a category of local building trades union leaders-chief business agents-is related to their performance in office, That is, are these officers rewarded for taking actions consistent with their members' best interests? An analysis of this question is greatly complicated by the multiplicity of tasks faced by local union officers, especially business agents, and the existence of geographic and occupational interdependencies in collective bargaining in the building trades industry.
The plan of our paper is as follows: In the next section we consider the problems involved in attempting to measure the performance of union officers and suggest several proxy measures. The third section outlines our empirical model of local union officers' compensation, discusses our data sources, and presents some summary statistics calculated from the data. Our empirical estimates of the determinants of local union leaders' compensation, based upon a sample of records from 670 local unions representing eleven crafts in sixty-eight large cities, are presented in the fourth section. Finally, we offer some brief concluding comments.
Studies of the determinants of the compensation of local building trades union leaders have been conducted previously, but they have primarily been descriptive, two-way tabulations of local union leaders' compensation and local unions' character- istics (such as size) without any behavioral model. 0 One previous study did provide a multivariate analysis of local union leaders' compensation. 7 Unfortunately, it was confined to a single geographic area, ignored the geographic and occupational interdependency of collective bargaining in the industry, and contained an estimating equation with a functional form that was, as explained below, misspecified.
Measurement of Leaders' Performance
Local building trades unions elect numerous officials, including some who are salaried. Typically each local elects a fulltime, salaried business agent who has primary responsibility for industrial relations in the union. 8 One important function of business agents is to represent the local in its collective bargaining negotiations; others include representing the local before legal bodies, handling grievances of the local's members, directing strikes and boycotts, defending the jurisdiction of the local, and policing and enforcing provisions of contracts. Given these numerous tasks, any complete measure of a business agent's performance would necessarily have many dimensions. For the purpose of this paper, however, we focus on a single dimension: the level of compensation the business agent attains at the bargaining table for his local's members. Collective bargaining agreements in the building trades industry are typically negotiated for a local union for a single craft in a particular geographic area. 9 Bargaining in the industry is notoriously interdependent, however, with local union members being concerned not only with the absolute level of their wages but also with their wages relative to the wages of other crafts in the same city and to the wages in their craft in other cities. 10 It is not a priori obvious whether union members evaluate business agents' performance with reference to percentage or absolute wage differentials. Therefore we specify two sets of measures of business agents' performance for use in our empirical analysis: (1) a set based upon percentage differentials: the journeyman wage scale for their particular local union relative to the aver-oExceptions to this rule are national or regional agreements covering the construction or installation of pipelines, sprinkler systems, and elevators, with local union wages in the last case being re. lated to the wages of other local crafts in the area by a fixed formula. Also, several crafts in other sectors of the industry often engage in regional bargaining, often by metropolitan area, in the western section of the country. See Mills, Industrial Relations and Manpower in Construction, for details. We attempt to take account of these exceptions in our empirical work below (see footnote 22).
ioFor age journeyman wage scale in the city (RWi) and the journeyman wage scale for their local relative to the average national journeyman wage in the craft (RWt)', (2) a set based upon absolute differentials: the journeyman wage scale for their particular local union minus the average journeyman wage scale in the city {DWJ) and the journeyman wage scale for their local minus the average national journeyman wage in the craft (DW?).
Our use of the these measures indicates our belief that union members are more concerned with the level of their relative position at a point in time than with recent changes in their relative position. 11 Put another way, our belief is that unions whose members' wages are relatively high will not penalize their leaders if they attain smaller than average percentage or absolute wage gains in a given year because of the members' awareness of the difficulties involved in trying to maintain an "outlier" position (the phenomenon of regression to the mean).
An Empirical Model of Compensation
The objective of this paper is to relate local union leaders' compensation to their performance. Broadly defined, a leader's compensation may be increased in two ways: first, through increases in monetary payments or fringe benefits; second, through being retained in office. Business agents and other officials are political figures who must stand for reelection periodically (at one-to three-year intervals in the case of business agents) and thus local member satisfaction with their performance may be reflected by their not being voted out of office as well as by increases in their com* pensation. Unfortunately, because of the cross-sectional nature of our data, we are restricted to considering only the impact of performance on monetary payments to officers. 12 Hence the results presented below "If the opposite were true, the relevant perform. ance measures would be the changes or percentage changes in RW t and RW^ (or DW t and DW 2 ).
"Research on the determinants of local union officials' tenure is currently being conducted by a Ph.D. candidate under Glen Cain's direction at Wisconsin. understate the total incentive effect for performance that business agents face.
Our basic hypothesis is that local union leaders' compensation is related both to measures of the union's ability to pay and to measures of their agents' performance, Empirically, this is reflected in cross-section estimating equations of the form: Variants of Equations 1 and 2 in which the "absolute differential" performance measures (DW t and DW?) replace the "percentage differential" measures (RWi and RW?) are also specified but not shown (Equations 8 and 4) . Two features of these equations should be noted. First, total annual dues (X x ), total "journeymen-equivalent" members (X 2 ), and total net assets (X 3 ) of the local union are included as measures of the local union's ability to pay its officers. In a more complete model all of these ability-to-pay variables might be considered endogenous, as they are at least partially determined by previous and current wage scales of union members and the number and duration of strikes conducted by the local union in the past. Since we lack data on their determinants, however, these variables are treated as exogenous for the purpose of this study. 18 As might be expected, these variables are strongly correlated across locals within a craft and it is difficult to estimate their independent effects precisely.
Second, Equation 2 specifies that the marginal impact of performance on the level of union leaders' compensation is a function of the size of the local union. That is,
it is hypothesized that the magnitude of the increase in salary a business agent receives if he achieves a given level of performance will be larger in a large than a small local union, since the larger the union, the larger the total increase in earnings received by the members. Although this seems like a plausible hypothesis, one might also argue that the impact of performance is invariant "An interesting extension of the present study would be to consider their determinants explicitly. One might develop a model of the supply and  demand for union services, for example, and derive  a reduced form estimating equation for the market  clearing price (such as monthly dues per man) . Sadly, our data do not permit us to do this. ures, were not statistically significant. This was due to both the small number of degrees of freedom for some crafts and the presence of multicollinearity among the ability-to-pay variables within each craft.
In an attempt to alleviate these problems, Equations 1 and 2 and their variants were reestimated with all of the observations pooled into one sample in four different manners: (a) all coefficients constrained to be the same across crafts, (b) all coefficients except the intercept terms constrained to be the same across crafts, (c) all coefficients except the intercept terms and the coefficient of RW a (or DW 2 ) constrained to be the same across crafts, and (d) all coefficients except the intercept terms and the coefficients of RW t and RW a (or DW X and DWj) constrained to be the same across crafts. Based upon the residual sum of squares from these equations, formal F tests were conducted to see which, if any, of the above restrictions do not significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model.
These tests indicated that the restrictions imposed in (c) did not significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model as compared to (he unconstrained (separate equation for each craft) case. Furthermore, the restrictions imposed in (c) did not significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model as compared to case (d). However, requiring that the coefficient of the withincraft performance measure be constant across crafts (cases (a) and (b)) did significantly reduce the explanatory power of the model as compared to the unconstrained case. Consequently, we conclude that pooling the data across crafts is permissible if done as in case (c) and in Table 2 we present estimates of Equations 1 and 2 and their variants, which replace RW X and RW* by DWt and DW 2 (Equations 8 and   4 ).
Pooling the data substantially improves the precision of our estimates. As expected, total dues and net local assets tend to be significantly related to chief business agents' salaries. 19 The local union's wage scale, however, relative to (or minus) the average wage scale of all crafts in the city is not a significant determinant of chief business agents' salaries in any specification. 20 Focusing on the adjusted coefficients of determination (R 8 ), it is quite clear that Equation 2, which utilizes a percentage differential performance measure and postulates that the impact of performance on local union leaders' salary is proportional to the size of the local, is the preferred specification. 21 For this specification, the coefficient of the within-craft performance measure (RW?) is positive, as predicted, in ten of eleven cases and statistically significant for five of the crafts. Moreover, similar patterns can be observed for the withincraft performance measures in the lesspreferred Equations 1, 8, and 4. Taken together, these estimates provide initial evidence that performance in office influences local building trades leaders' compensation. 22 "The insignificant coefficients obtained for the number of "full-time equivalent" members may be due to measurement error in this variable (see footnote 18). 20One possible explanation for the poor performance of this variable is that the use of the average building trades journeyman wage scale in the city in the denominator may be a misspecificatlon. That is, the denominator will vary across cities, even if each building trade's journeyman wage Is the same in all cities, simply because the occupational mix of journeymen varies across cities. This suggests that either a fixed weight index or the use of a single craft's wage as a base might have been preferable. Unfortunately, data on building trades employment levels by occupation and city are not available to use in constructing such an index and it was not clear, in the latter case, what the appropriate base wage craft would have been. The use of a simple average across the eleven crafts in a city is an alternative to our approach; however, preliminary experiments with this measure at early stages in our research did not yield significantly different results. aiEquations were also estimated in which RW it RW 2 > RWi• X 2 , and RW a • X 2 appeared. However, formal F tests indicated the inclusion of RWi and RWi did not significantly improve the explanatory power over Equation 2.
"We noted in footnote 9 that regional bargaining occurs in some crafts in the West. To see if including western cities distorted our estimates, we eliminated sixteen western cities from our sample and reestimated Equation 2. Estimates obtained from this reduced sample differed only marginally from those found in Table 2 and hence are not presented here. We also noted previously the unique bargaining framework under which the wages of elevator constructors are tied to the wage scales of other crafts in the area. The significant performance appear to be rewarded quite well for their efforts."
Qualifications and Conclusion

